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1. 
RESPONSE STRATEGIES IN PROBLEMATIC ALLIANCES: 
AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 
 
Olivier Furrer and Brian den Ouden 
Radboud University Nijmegen 
 
Abstract 
Building on Hirschman’s (1970) seminal work, we proposed and tested a circular model of 
seven response strategies in problematic alliances: exit propensity, opportunism, aggressive 
voice, creative voice, considerate voice, patience, and neglect. Previous alliance studies failed 
to theorize on the relationship between response strategies and examined responses to 
problematic situations in isolation. In contrast, in this study we focus on the interdependence 
between responses strategies and their antecedents. The response strategies studied are 
conceptually different, empirical distinct and can be represented as a circular system. 
Furthermore, the effect of four exchange variables: economic satisfaction, social satisfaction, 
transaction specific investments, and availability of alternatives are investigated. Using an 
experimental design empirical results support the hypotheses relating exchange variables and 
response strategies in problematic strategic alliances.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Strategic alliances are dynamic inter-organizational relationships that allow partner firms to 
obtain or access resources which are needed to achieve their objectives. They entail long-term 
investments in a relationship and the initial agreement is only one component of a much 
broader challenge of achieving superior alliance performance. Strategic alliances cannot be 
completely specified or controlled by the parties in advance of their implementation (Ring & 
Van de Ven, 1994) and therefore they are surrounded by uncertainty, interdependence and 
vulnerability often leading to instability and problematic situations (Inkpen, 2001; Inkpen & 
Beamish, 1997). 
 
To sustain an alliance performance, partners need to identify and respond the problematic 
situations occurring within the alliance as a result of changing external or internal 
circumstances; because these changes could turn an efficient and effective alliance into a 
second-best alternative (Koza & Lewin, 1998). For instance, a potential new partner could 
propose to collaborate with one of the partner firms, offering innovative technologies with 
better market opportunities than a partner has with its existing relationship. One of the partner 
firms could also change its strategy for reasons that are unrelated to an existing relationship, 
nevertheless this change can force it to reassess and reorganize its alliance portfolio (Parise & 
Casher, 2003). Developments endogenous to the relationship could also result in problematic 
situations. Current alliance performance may not meet initial expectations, because realized 
profits may be well below the initial projections. Similarly, a firm may perceive the quality 
the interactions with its partner as problematic. A lack of trust, willingness to adapt, or lack of 
commitment by a partner may negatively influence alliance development (Ariño & de la 
Torre, 1998). Research on strategic alliances has shown that partner firms’ responses to these 
emerging problematic situations may follow various trajectories. 
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Alliance partners may respond constructively or destructively (for the relationship) to these 
problematic situations. Constructive responses aim at adapting the alliance to solve the 
problematic situation. Partners can engage in renegotiations (Ariño & Reuer, 2004), change 
the governance structure (Reuer, Zollo, & Singh, 2002), or overcome the problems through 
mutual learning (Doz, 1996). In contrast, destructive responses lead to the further demise of 
the relationship. For instance, alliance partners may prematurely dissolve the relationship 
(Park & Ungson, 1997), let the relationship slowly deteriorate (Ariño et al., 1998), or decide 
to behave opportunistically (Ping, 1993). However, alliance research has only provided 
fragmented insights into firms’ possible responses to problematic situations.  
 
Researchers have studied individual responses to relationship decline when others have 
examined related phenomena, such as opportunism, trust, and power. While the alliance 
literature has identified a variety of inter-firm behaviors and explored the characteristics and 
determinants of several responses to relationship decline, it mainly focused on single 
responses in isolation of one another. This fragmentation has undermined the development of 
theoretical typologies able to describe the full range of possible reactions to alliance 
dissatisfaction. In the absence of such typologies, it is difficult to develop a comprehensive 
theory-based understanding of the alliance decline process. 
 
The objective of the paper is twofold. First, we aim at demonstrating that, contrary to prior 
alliance studies, response strategies are interdependent in a circular system. Second, we 
examine under which conditions a particular response strategy is most likely to occur. To 
achieve these objectives, we propose and empirically test a systematic model of response 
strategies, which encompasses: (1) a circular organization of response strategies, and (2) the 
impact of exchange variables.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follow: First, based on a review of the relevant literature, 
we identified seven response strategies applicable within the strategic alliance context. 
Second, we hypothesize that these seven response strategies should be conceptualized as 
circular system of interrelated strategies. Third, consistent with previous research on response 
strategies, which are likely to differently impact the likelihood of use a response strategy. 
Fourth, we present the experimental design we developed to test our hypothesis. Then, we 
present the results and conclude with a discussion of the academic and managerial 
implications of our results and propose directions for further research. 
 
ALLIANCE DYNAMICS 
An alliance is defined as a voluntarily long-term cooperative arrangement between firms 
(Gulati, Nohria, & Zaheer, 2000). A substantial part of alliance literature focuses on alliance 
dynamics and examines issues related to the changing patterns of strategies, resources, 
structures, and behavior of partners within alliances (Rond de & Bouchikhi, 2004). This 
literature can be organized around three themes: studies focusing on the alliance adaptability 
over time; studies which have investigated alliance termination; and finally studies which 
seek to better understand how alliances solve their problems. 
 
Several studies have investigated the adaptability of alliance over time (Ariño et al., 1998; 
Doz, 1996; Ring et al., 1994; Zajac & Olsen, 1993). Zajac and Olson (1993) described how 
firms proceed through three stages, initializing, processing, and reconfiguring. During the first 
two stages, parties design and implement an alliance, while the third stage pertains to an 
assessment of outcomes which fuel changes in alliance strategy and exchange processes. Ring 
and Van de Ven (1993) noticed that negotiation, commitment, and execution affect each other 
and are influenced by partner’s assessment of the relationship’s efficiency and equity.  
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Doz (1996) explored ex-post learning processes and found that successful alliances are 
subject to adaptations in initial conditions, such as tasks, partner routines, interface structure, 
and expectations of performance, behavior, and motives. Ariño and De la Torre (1998) 
extended this work and detailed the importance of external changes, the role of relational 
quality, and the different adjustment trajectories parties could adopt. These alliance 
developmental studies show that strategic alliances adapt to changing internal and external 
conditions and could respond with destructive or constructive behaviors.  
 
Some alliance studies have examined alliance termination and the trajectory towards 
relationship ending (Hennart, Kim, & Zeng, 1998; Park & Russo, 1996). Termination is an 
ultimate and destructive response to a problematic situation. Once the alliance is dissolved 
each party is forced to seek an alternative solution to achieve its objectives, which might 
include internal development, acquisition of the partner, or a establishing a new alliance. 
Various causes of alliance dissolution have been identified. For instance, Steensma and Lyles 
(2000) found evidence that conflict between the parents of a joint venture decreased the 
likelihood for continuation and Park and Ungson (1997) found that opportunistic threat and 
rivalry between partners appeared to be a stronger indication of joint venture dissolution. 
Studies investigating relationship ending, found evidence that parties before dissolving an 
alliance might respond differently (Halinen & Tahtinen, 2002). A party could attempt to 
increase its benefits through opportunistic behavior (Parkhe, 1993), it could coerce its partner 
to comply with new demands (Inkpen et al., 1997), which would resolve the perceived 
problem, or it could let the alliance slowly deteriorate (Ping, 1993). In contrast to this type of 
destructive responses, parties could aim at resolving the problematic situation constructively.  
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Finally, other studies have identified various types of constructive responses including 
contractual renegotiations (Blodgett, 1992; Reuer et al., 2002), collaborative problem-solving 
(Doz, 1996), and strategic changes (Das & Teng, 2002). Doz (1996) concluded that as 
partners collaborate, they recognize how differences in structure and processes may need to 
be overcome or constructively combined to make cooperation efficient. Multiple factors have 
been examined to explain constructive responses to problematic situations. Ganesan (1994) 
found that mutual dependence and trust were positively related to parties’ long-term 
orientation. Arino and De la Torre (1998) found that when relational quality was high and 
parties perceived differences in regard to alliance outcomes, they were likely to initiate 
renegotiations to restore the equilibrium. Some other studies showed that transaction specific 
investments are a powerful incentive to preserve a relationship (Heide & John, 1990). 
Anderson and Weitz (1992) found within a buyer-supplier context that commitments to make 
specific investments increased the likelihood for relationship continuity. Thus, these studies 
reveal that constructive changes are possible before an alliance prematurely ends, while 
revealing different causes of specific response behaviors.  
 
The review of this literature calls for two remarks. First, alliance studies examined partner 
firm’s responses to problems within an alliance mostly in isolation. The literature is 
fragmented and despite that some of these studies provide clues about the interrelatedness of 
response strategies (see e.g. Ariño et al., 1998; Doz, 1996) an in-depth understanding on post-
formation decisions is till lacking. Second, the review also reveals that multiple causes of 
partner firms’ response behavior have been identified. However a comprehensive framework 
to understand what influences managers to choose between specific responses still needs to be 
developed. The development of a systematic model of response strategies and its antecedents 
will contribute to our better understating of ex-post strategic alliance partner firms’ behaviors.  
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RESPONSE STRATEGIES 
In order to develop a systematic model of response strategies, we build on Hirschman’s 
(1970) exit, voice, and loyalty and it later developments. Hirschman’s (1970) seminal 
framework is probably the most popular stream of research on response strategies over the 
past 35 years. A study of “Social Science Citation Index” listings finds more than 2300 
citations from Hirschman (1970) during the period from March 1993 to August 2006. While 
Hirschman’s framework was developed to explain the responses of organizations to decline, 
its has been proved useful in understanding how individuals may act when things are not 
going well in a large range of relationship situations, such as romantic involvement (e.g. 
Rusbult, 1987; Rusbult, Johnson, & Morrow, 1986; Rusbult & Zembrodt, 1983; Withey & 
Cooper, 1989); employee-supervisor relationship (e.g Farrell, 1983; Saunders, Sheppard, 
Knight, & Roth, 1992); customer-complaint (e.g. Bove & Robertson, 2005; Singh, 1990); and 
business-to-business relationship (e.g. Geyskens & Steenkamp, 2000; Ping, 1993, 1997, 
1999). However, before applying Hirschman’s model to the strategic alliance context, two 
issues need to be discussed: which and how many response strategy types should we use? 
How are these different response strategy types related to each other? 
 
Response Strategy Types 
Originally, Hirschman (1970) only identified three response strategies: exit, voice, and 
loyalty. Exit is the disinclination to continue a current relationship; voice, the expression of 
dissatisfaction (change a state of objectionable affairs); and loyalty has been depicted as 
willingness to trade-off the certainty of exit against the uncertainties of future improvements. 
Scholars have quickly started to refine this typology by adding new strategies. Farrell (1983) 
and Rusbult and Zembrodt (1983) found empirical support for a fourth strategy, neglect, 
which is passively allowing the relationship to deteriorate.  
Response Strategies in Problematic Alliances: An Experimental Study 
8. 
This strategy corresponds to the silence response strategy previously proposed by Kolarska 
and Aldrich (1980) and Rusbult, Zembrodt, and Gunn (1982). Silence referred to a “do 
nothing” option, in which a dissatisfied customer or organization member would stay without 
expressing themselves. Drawing from transaction cost theory (TCT) (Williamson, 1975), Ping 
(1993) introduced the concept of opportunism as an additional response strategy identified in 
the supply chain management context and defined opportunism as self-interest with guile 
(Williamson, 1975). Withey and Cooper (1989) experiencing measurement problems with 
voice concluded that voice should consist of multiple sub-components. They noticed that 
voice could regroup different type of behaviors ranging from intentions to improve the 
situation, encourage discussion of issues and problems, and propose new ways of doing 
things. Addressing these concerns, Hagedoorn et al. (1999) proposed and tested empirically 
two distinct forms of voice: considerate voice, which consists in attempts to solve problems 
by considering one’s own concerns as well as those of the alliance and aggressive voice, 
which consists in efforts to push one’s own solution, without consideration for the concerns of 
the partner. More recently, Zhou and George (in press) further identified creativity as a third 
expression of voice, which refers to the generation of novel and potentially useful ideas. 
 
These seven responses to relationship problems can also be identified in the strategic alliance 
context. Exit propensity, the disinclination to continue the current relationship (Ping, 1999 p. 
226), suggest that a party has an intention to terminate the alliance and actively searches for 
alternative solutions to achieve its objectives, including acquisition of the partner, internal 
development, or initiating new alliances (Dussauge, Garrette, & Mitchell, 2000). 
Opportunism refers to a party’s response in the form of an active intention to increase its 
benefits from the relationship in ways that are explicitly or implicitly prohibited within the 
relationship (Ping, 1993).  
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This type of response might include, shirking, the use circumstances to extract concessions 
form the other party, the evasion of obligations, or the withholding of critical information 
(Wathne & Heide, 2000). This definition is distinct from the TCT perspective as here 
opportunistic behavior results from a condition external or internal to the alliance, while TCT 
assumes that actors will act opportunistically when such behavior is feasible and profitable 
(John, 1984). Aggressive voice represents a form of voice, which consists of persistent efforts 
by a party to resolve a problematic situation consistent with its own ideas. For instance, a firm 
might forcefully argue its solutions and actively seek conflicts with its partner in order to 
resolve a problematic situation consistent with this party’s interests. In contrast, creative voice 
refers to the generation of novel and potentially useful solutions to the problem (Zhou et al., 
In press). Within an alliance this suggest that partners overcome structural inertia through 
mutual learning and subsequently implement innovative adaptations which allows each party 
to achieve its objectives (Doz, 1996). Considerate voice refers to a form of voice which 
consists of attempts to solve the problem considering ones own concerns as well of those of 
the other party (Ping, 1999). A party might seek constructive solutions with the aim to 
preserve the relationship, while considering the other party’s interests. The problematic 
situation is discussed and mutual satisfactory solutions are developed. Patience is defined as 
abiding the problems in silence with confidence that things will get better (Ping, 1999 p. 226). 
This suggests that a firm might ignore the problem, assume it will go away, reduce its contact 
with the partner, all with the idea that the problematic situation will resolve itself. Finally, 
neglect means allowing the relationship to deteriorate (Ping, 1999 p. 226). Similarly, to 
patience contact with the partner might be reduced, however a party spends little effort to 
maintain the relationship. Efforts to solve the problem are intentionally ignored and the aim is 
to let the relationship die.  
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From both the alliance dynamics’ literature and the literature on response strategies reviewed 
above, we hypothesize that the content of response strategies in problematic alliances can be 
classified in seven conceptually different and empirically distinct response types: exit, 
opportunism, aggressive voice, creative voice, considerate voice, patience, and neglect. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The response strategies in a strategic alliance context should 
appear as seven distinct response strategy types. 
 
Response Strategy Structure 
The relationship between the different response strategies is one of the unsolved questions in 
response research (Leck & Saunders, 1992). Several different conceptualizations of the 
relationships between responses strategies have been adopted by the various strands of 
research: Response strategies have been conceptualized as independent from each other, they 
have been organized along a unidimensional continuum, two dimensions, and following a 
circular structure.  
 
Some scholars have conceptualized response strategies as independent constructs. In the 
context of consumer complaint behaviors, Singh (1988) developed a taxonomy containing 
three independent dimensions: Voice, that is, responses directed toward objects directly 
involved in the dissatisfying relationship; Private, that is, negative word-of-mouth 
communication and exit from the relationship; and Third Party, that is, complain to formal 
agencies not involved in the exchange relationship. Studying customers’ behavioral intentions 
when service problems occur, Zeithaml, Berry, and Parasuraman (1996) identified three 
independent dimensions: propensity to switch, external response to problem, and internal 
response to problem. 
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A second set of studies, following with Hirschman (1970) initial representation of exit, voice, 
and loyalty along a constructive-destructive continuum, have conceptualized response 
strategies along a unidimensional continuum. For example, in his study of the antecedents of 
exiting a marketing channel relationship, Ping (1999) investigated the structural relationships 
between loyalty, voice, neglect, and exit propensity. The empirical results revealed a chain of 
relationships between the response strategies. Loyalty had a negative influence on voice, 
which in turn, decreased the propensity to engage in negligent behavior. Finally, neglect was 
positively related to exit propensity. 
 
Building on Hirschman’s framework, Farrell (1983) and Rusbult and Zembrodt (1983) 
empirically identified a second active-passive dimension in addition to the initial 
constructive-destructive one. Each of the four response strategies is located in a quadrant 
formed by these two dimensions. Exit represents an active-destructive response strategy, 
voice represents an active-constructive strategy, loyalty (or patience) represents a passive-
constructive response strategy, and finally, neglect represents a passive-destructive response 
strategy to dissatisfying relationships. 
 
Later, Rusbult (1987) further argued that even if response strategy types are conceptually 
different and empirically distinct, they are also, to some extent, continuously related and 
overlapping. For example, weak forms of exit verge on neglect, strong forms of loyalty verge 
on voice, and so on. While responses frequently occur in their pure form, an organization’s 
response to problems may on some occasions be a blend of two or more categories. For 
instance, dissatisfied employees might quit their jobs, while expressing their complaints to 
their supervisors. Thus, although the response strategies are conceptually and empirically 
distinct the boundaries between the response strategies are imprecise (Withey et al., 1989). 
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This leads Hagedoorn et al. (1999) to argue that response strategies should be depicted along 
a circumplex structure, around the two constructive-destructive and active-passive 
dimensions. Research in several different contexts has further provided direct and indirect 
empirical support for the circular structure of response strategies. Indirect support can be 
found by examining correlation matrices in earlier studies, which did not explicitly 
hypothesize a circular structure. For example, Rusbult et al. (1988) (Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers, 
& Mainous, 1988) found in the context of declining job satisfaction that exit is positively 
correlated to a form of aggressive voice (r = .21) and neglect (r = .31), while in turn exit is 
negative correlated to loyalty (r = -.33). The results also indicated, that loyalty was negatively 
correlated to neglect (r = -.18). This pattern is consistent with a circular structure. Rusbult, 
Johnson and Morrow’s (Rusbult et al., 1986) study further confirmed that the four modes of 
response bear the predicted relations to each other. Their findings showed that theoretically 
opposed response strategies, such as exit and loyalty as well as voice and neglect were 
negative correlated (r = -.15 to -.30), while response strategies which were hypothesized in 
contiguous quadrants were weakly or not at all correlated (r = between .00 and .03). Within 
the context of strategic alliances, empirical results also indirectly support the circular 
structure. For example, the inspection of the correlation matrix presented in Ping (1993) 
revealed that exit-propensity and neglect (r = .70), opportunism (r= .41), and loyalty (r = .04) 
had positive correlations, while a negative correlation was reported between exit-propensity 
and voice (r = -.25). Other correlations also showed that contiguous responses were positively 
correlated, for instance opportunism and neglect (r = .45), while opposite strategies were 
negatively related, for instance voice and opportunism (r = -.28) and voice and neglect (r = -
.39). Similar intercorrelation patterns can be found in the studies by Ping (1999) and 
Geyskens and Steenkamp (2000). 
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Direct support is provided by Hagedoorn et al (1999), who conducted a second order factor 
analysis on five response strategies (exit, aggressive voice, considerate voice, patience, and 
neglect) in the employee-supervisor relationships, which resulted in two factors consistent 
with active-passive and constructive-destructive. The correlation pattern was furthermore 
consistent with a circular structure, although exit and aggressive voice were less active and 
neglect less passive than expected. The circular structure was also supported by the 
correlations between the response strategies. For instance, they found that exit was positively 
correlated to neglect (r = 0.24) and aggressive voice (r = 0.36), while negatively correlated to 
considerate voice (r = -.10) and patience (r = -.05). Other correlations supporting a circular 
structure were the negative relationships between aggressive voice and neglect (r = -.26) and 
patience (r = -.12).  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Based on these conceptual and empirical findings, we hypothesize that in the strategic alliance 
context, the seven response strategies should be arranged along a continuum of related 
strategies in the following order: exit, opportunism, aggressive voice, creative voice, 
considerate, patience, and neglect, exhibiting a circular structure (see Figure 1). We expect 
that, for example, creative voice and considerate voice to be located next to each other, 
because both involve active and constructive propensities. Conversely, exit, which 
emphasizes active destruction, is likely to be located opposite to patience, which reflects a 
passive and constructive behavioral intention. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The seven response strategies are organized in a circular system of 
intercorrelations. 
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THE IMPACT OF THE EXCHANGE VARIABLES ON RESPONSE STRATEGIES 
A circular structure of response strategies is an integrated structure, which imply that the 
association of one response strategy with an external variable, such as satisfaction with the 
alliance, has implication for the associations of this variable with the other response strategies 
as well (Gurtman, 1992; Gurtman & Balakrishnan, 1998; Hagedoorn et al., 1999). The 
associations with the external variable will first decrease from the most positively (or least 
negatively) associated response strategy and then increase again as one goes around the 
circular structure (Schwartz, 1992). 
 
Across its various contexts of application, multiple causes impacting the likelihood of using a 
particular response strategy have been identified (Farrell & Rusbult, 1992; Ping, 1993, 1999, 
2003; Rusbult et al., 1988; Rusbult et al., 1986). Based on the theoretical developments of 
social exchange theory (Blau, 1964; Homans, 1961) and interpersonal interdependence theory 
(Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) four of exchange variables have been identified as having a 
consistent effect of response strategies across contexts: economic satisfaction with the 
relationship, social satisfaction with the relationship, past investments in the relationship, and 
the presence of available alternatives.  
 
Alliance studies examining response strategies identified antecedents consistent with this 
relational exchange perspective. For instance, Ping (1993) examined the influence of 
relationship satisfaction, alternative attractiveness, investments, and switching costs on 
behavioral intentions. In a subsequent study, Ping (1999) introduced a higher order concept, 
cost of exit, which referred to perceived mobility barriers between a party and alternative 
relationships. In addition, Geyskens and Steenkamp (2000) demonstrated that economic 
satisfaction is conceptually and empirically distinct from social satisfaction within alliances. 
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Economic Satisfaction 
In a strategic alliance context, economic satisfaction is a partner’s evaluation of the economic 
outcomes that flow from the relationship with its partner, such as effectiveness, productivity, 
and financial outcomes (Geyskens et al., 2000). Economic satisfaction implies that a manager 
considers the relationship with an alliance partner to be successful in regard to goal attainment 
(Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 1999), and if the demand for quick and tangible results is 
satisfied (Das & Teng, 2000). 
 
Studies in different contexts found empirical support for the effect of satisfaction on response 
strategies. Rusbult et al (1982) presented results of four studies examining dissatisfaction in 
romantic involvements, showing that subjects who were satisfied with their relationship were 
more likely to respond with constructive responses (e.g. voice and patience) and were less 
likely to respond with destructive responses (e.g. exit and neglect). Similar results were 
replicated in the context of employment relationship (Farrell and Rusbult, 1992; Rusbult et 
al., 1988). Hagedoorn et al. (1999) found that job satisfaction promotes constructive and 
suppresses destructive responses to a problematic event. In a supply chain context, Ping 
(1993) found that channel satisfaction is positively related to active and negatively to 
destructive responses. Geyskens and Steenkamp (2000) found that economic satisfaction is 
positively related to voice and loyalty and negatively related to exit-propensity and neglect. 
 
Despite that alliance managers regularly monitor the alliance for efficiency (Doz, 1996), it 
often difficult to attribute a decrease in economic performance to a single specific cause. The 
reasons for poor economic performance could be internal to the relationship with the partner 
or external to this relationship (i.e., seasonal variations, economic downturn, etc.). Poor 
performance could be attributed to a temporary downturn in the external environment.  
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If the strategic alliance has been successful and valuable in the past, when the economic 
performance drops, managers may not be willing to use a response strategy that will be 
destructive to the relationship in order to preserve future revenue stream (Dwyer, Schurr, & 
Oh, 1987; Geyskens et al., 2000; Ping, 1993, 1997). There is therefore no reason to terminate 
the alliance. However, managers who are not satisfied with the economic performance of their 
alliance may engage into opportunistic behaviors in order to be compensated for the lack of 
economic outcomes, because these opportunistic behaviors may be less visible to the partner 
and therefore not too detrimental to the future of the alliance. 
 
On the other hand, when an alliance is problematic, but managers are satisfied with the 
economic outcomes of the relationship, they are less likely to “rock the boat” and to endanger 
a source of future revenues (Dwyer et al., 1987; Geyskens et al., 2000; Hirschman, 1970; 
Ping, 1993, 1997). Managers will be more likely to be patient and not to use their voice, in 
order to reduce the likelihood of a worsening of the relationship (Ping, 1997). Therefore, in a 
problematic alliance, when a partner is satisfied with the economic performance of the 
alliance, it will be more likely respond with patience. Therefore, based on the circular 
structure of response strategies, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Managers who are satisfied with the economic performance of the 
alliance should be the most likely to engage in patience and the least likely to 
engage in opportunism compared with managers who are dissatisfied with the 
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Social Satisfaction 
In a strategic alliance context, social satisfaction is a partner’s evaluation of the psychosocial 
aspects of the relationship in that interactions with the alliance partner are fulfilling, 
gratifying, and facile (Geyskens et al., 2000). A partner who is satisfied with the social 
outcomes of the relationship appreciates the contacts with its partner (Geyskens et al., 1999). 
The relationship is then characterized by trust, respect, and commitment (Ariño, de la Torre, 
& Ring, 2001). An important aspect of social satisfaction is a party’s perception of the 
relational quality of the alliance, which refers to the working relationship, trustworthiness, 
and to the broader reputation the partners have for fair dealing (Ariño et al., 1998). 
 
Empirical results from Geyskens and Steenkamp (2000) show that social satisfaction is 
positively related to creative voice and negatively related to exit, patience, and neglect. 
Furthermore, Dwyer and Oh (1987) also found that a high quality relationship is characterized 
by minimal opportunism and Hennig-Thurau, Gwinner and Gremler (2002) found that when 
relationship quality is good, partners are less likely to exit and more likely to use creative 
voice to maintain the relationship. 
 
In the strategic alliance context, managers regularly monitor their partners for equity and 
adaptability (Ring et al., 1994). When an alliance becomes problematic, managers who are 
not satisfied with the quality of the relationship tend to attribute the causes of the problem to 
their partner (Frazier, 1983). Because, it is more difficult to solve relationship problems than 
economical ones (Geyskens et al., 2000), managers are more likely to disengage from the 
relationship and exit. Furthermore, when the social satisfaction is low, managers are not afraid 
to endanger an already bad relationship and therefore are more likely to act opportunistically 
to extract all benefits possible before the relationship ends.  
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Therefore, bad relationship quality reduces expectations about future benefits and result in 
increasing suspicion about the intentions of the partner managers tend to see no hope for the 
recovery of the alliance and thus reduce their level of commitment and cooperation, resulting 
in the likelihood of exit and opportunistic strategies (Withey et al., 1989). 
 
On the other hand, when an alliance is problematic, but managers are satisfied with the 
quality of the relationship, they are less likely to blame their partner for the problems. 
Because of a good relationship, a partner believes that a recovery is possible (Geyskens et al., 
2000; Withey et al., 1989) and it will be more likely to engage in constructive discussions 
(Hibbard, Kumar, & Stern, 2001). Cooperative relationships based on trust and commitment 
can deliver significant social benefits to the participating firms. Thus, high relationship 
quality is most likely to result in amicable and creative resolving of the problems (Anderson 
& Narus, 1990; Richins, 1983). Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Managers who are satisfied with the relational quality of the 
alliance should be the most likely to engage in creative and considerate voices 
and the least likely to engage in exit and opportunism compared with managers 
who are dissatisfied with the relational quality of the alliance. 
 
Transaction Specific Investments 
Transaction specific investments are investments made to support a given relationship and 
cannot be easily redeployed to another relationship without some sacrifice in the productivity 
of the asset or some cost in adapting the asset to the new context. Firms are willing to make 
such investments to build and maintain a valuable relationship in anticipation of future 
economic and social outcomes {Dwyer, 1987 #1104}.  
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When substantial investments in an alliance have been made and could be lost if the partners 
dissolve the alliance, these investments act as switching costs and exit barriers (Williamson, 
1975). While such exit barriers do not increase dissatisfaction, they do increase the partners’ 
costs of terminating the alliance. By increasing these costs, transaction-specific investments 
reduce exit. Furthermore, when an alliance partner invests in specific assets, it puts itself in a 
vulnerable position as the other partner might hold it up and expropriate quasi-rents (Klein, 
Crawford, & Alchian, 1978). Therefore the existence of such investments is likely to trigger 
active and constructive response strategies, such as considerate and creative voices, when the 
alliance becomes problematic (Maute & Forrester, 1993; Ping, 1993). In other words, 
transaction-specific investments promote constructive response strategies, while the absence 
of them increases the likelihood for more destructive responses (Farrell et al., 1992; Ping, 
1993; Rusbult et al., 1988). When costs of exits are high, less costly reactions to relationship 
problems, such as voice, become more attractive (Hirschman, 1970; Ping, 1997). 
Furthermore, a passive response, such as neglect, may be too risky a strategy as it might lead 
to premature ending of the alliance, thus loosing investments (Ping, 1997). 
 
Studies have produced empirical support for the importance of relationship specific 
investments on the likelihood of response strategies. For example, Rusbult et al. (Rusbult et 
al., 1988; Rusbult et al., 1986; Rusbult et al., 1982) found that substantial investments 
encourage voice and loyalty, while they inhibited the destructive exit and neglect strategies. 
Similarly, within the context of supply chain management, Ping (1993) found that 
investments are positively related to voice and negatively to neglect, but not to exit, loyalty, 
or opportunism. Therefore, based on the circular structure of response strategies, we 
hypothesize that: 
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Hypothesis 5: Managers who have made substantial transaction specific 
investments should be the most likely to engage in considerate and creative voices 
and the least likely to engage in exit and neglect compared with managers who 
did not made substantial alliance-specific investments. 
 
Available Alternatives 
Available alternatives refer to extent to which a partner in a strategic alliance has attractive 
alternatives available to attain its objectives (Ping, 1999). The availability of alternatives 
provides a party with a source of power to improve the situation at its advantage because if 
the relationship would further decline, it has other possible solutions (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). Available alternatives permit alliance partners to advance their interests by terminating 
the current alliance and should, for this reason, lead to greater propensity to exit. 
 
However, the interests of a partner who are disinclined to exit are best served by closing the 
gap between the current, problematic alliance and more attractive available alternative 
partners. Aggressive voice serves a purpose in this regard and should increase as the 
availability of attractive alternative increases (Maute et al., 1993). Furthermore, the presence 
of alternatives should result in reduced patience as managers become increasingly skeptical 
about whether their interests are served by the current alliance and less prepared to overlook 
the shortcomings of their current partner (Maute et al., 1993). 
 
On the one hand, decreased alternatives increased perception of dependence (Emerson, 1962). 
Partners that are relatively dependent on their counterpart feel they need to maintain the 
relationship to achieve their goals (Buchanan, 1992). They are unlikely to use responses that 
may result in escalation, or ultimately in the dissolution of the alliance.  
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In addition, aggressive voice is perceived as ineffective mechanism, because of the 
dependence imbalance, which allows the other partner to ignore the voice of the dependent 
party (Hibbard et al., 2001). The lack of alternatives can also reduce the credibility of voice, 
thereby reducing its efficacy, and hence its use, because partners who are in demand have 
greater power and are less threatened by the possibility of retaliation (Withey et al., 1989). 
Thus, response is more likely to be passive in the absence of alternatives (Ping, 1997). But, 
forced to make the relationship work, considerate voice could be used to find a consensus 
(Hagedoorn et al., 1999). On the other hand, an alliance partner with attractive alternatives 
may feel less positive about its present relationship and be less willing to act on the alliance 
behalf. Such partners are more likely to exit or to be neglectful (Withey et al., 1989). 
Termination for relationship may not be problematic for partners having better alternatives. 
 
Empirical research produced extant support for the relationship between alternative 
availability and responses to problematic situations. Rusbult et al. (1986, 1988, 1992) found 
that the higher the quality of alternatives the higher likelihood for active responses, such as 
exit and voice, while inhibiting loyalty and Farrell and Rusbult (1992) (Farrell et al., 1992) 
found that superior alternatives were associated with greater tendencies toward exit and voice, 
and in a lesser extent with neglect. Moreover, Withey and Cooper (1989) also found that 
having alternatives increased exit and neglect. In a supply channel context, Ping (1993) found 
that alternative attractiveness is positively related to exit-propensity, opportunism and 
unexpectedly with neglect. However, the relationships with voice and loyalty were non-
significant. In a subsequent study, however, Ping (1997) found that alternative attractiveness 
was positively related to considerate voice. Therefore, based on the circular structure of 
response strategies, we hypothesize: 
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Hypothesis 6: Managers who have alternative partners available should be the 
most likely to engage in exit and opportunism and the least likely to engage in 
creative and considerate voices and patience compared with managers who do 
not have alternative partners available. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
To empirically test these hypotheses, we designed an experimental scenario-based study. An 
experimental design was more suitable than other empirical studies, such as surveys, because 
it allows us to control the strategic alliance context and to manipulate the exchange variables. 
The use of scenarios rather than real situations was deemed necessary, because of the alliance 
setting. Indeed, managers are less likely to honestly answer questions about problematic 
situations. A survey of alliance managers would have most likely resulted in biased data. 
 
Scenario Design 
The research instrument consisted in four sections. The first section presented a hypothetical 
scenario introducing a problematic relationship between two organizations in a strategic 
alliance context. The second section contained the items pertaining to the evaluation of the 
response strategies. The third section contained control items to assess the extent to which the 
respondents understood the manipulations in the scenarios. The final section contained 
questions pertaining with the respondent characteristics, such as age and gender. 
 
Four manipulations were incorporated in each scenario. Each of them referred to either a 
positive or a negative condition. The first two manipulations referred to economic and social 
satisfaction (Geyskens et al., 2000). Economic satisfaction was manipulated through 
variations in the focal firm’s evaluation of the financial outcomes of the alliance.  
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That is, the alliance either produced financial benefits beyond or below the focal firm’s 
expectations. Social satisfaction was manipulated through the focal firm’s evaluation of 
relationship quality with its partner firm (Ariño et al., 2001; Das & Teng, 2001; Ring et al., 
1994). A good relationship referred to the extent to which the firms developed a relationship 
characterized by trust, commitment, and adaptability eliminating the need for substantial 
monitoring costs (Ring et al., 1994). Transaction-specific investment was manipulated 
through variations in the extent to which the focal firm had made substantial investments into 
the alliance and could expect large switching costs (Ping, 1999). The focal firm either 
invested little or substantially and could expect additional costs due to penalty fees to be paid 
to the partner firm if the alliance prematurely ends. The availability of alternatives was 
manipulated through the extent to which the focal firm had other ways to realize its 
objectives. The focal firm had either many alliance partners available or it only had a few 
other potential alliance partners (see Appendix). 
 
Response Strategy Measures 
The operationalization of the seven response strategies were based on prior literature and 
adapted to the context of our study. Exit propensity refers to the disinclination to continue the 
relationship. The items deal with considering ending the relationship, stop doing business, and 
having an intention to end the relationship. Measures and scales for opportunism were similar 
to those of Ping (1993) and involved items such as, withholding information, exaggeration of 
the problematic nature of the situation, and escaping from contractual obligations. Aggressive 
voice refers to extent to which an actor engages in efforts to win without consideration for the 
concerns of the partner firm and items referred for instance to forcefully push a solution and 
being persistent (Hagedoorn et al., 1999). Creative voice refers to a party’s behavioral 
intention aiming at adopting new and fresh approaches to solve the problematic situation.  
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As a consequence items were dealing with creation of innovative solutions, fresh ideas, and 
creative solutions (Zhou et al., In press). Considerate voice referred to seeking a mutual 
satisfactory solution and items deal with working to create a consensus, finding a solution 
satisfactory for everyone, and finding acceptable solutions (Ping, 1993). Patience, being 
confident that the problem will solve itself, was operationalized with items such as 
optimistically, I wait for better times and I trust that the situation will solve itself (Ping, 
1993). Neglect was measured as the intention to let the relationship slowly deteriorate. Items 
referred to not dealing with the problem, no additional effort, and presenting initiatives to 
improve the situation (Ping, 1993). All items were measures with 7-point Likert scales 
ranging from “I would definitely not react in this way” [1] to “I would definitely react in this 
way” [7].  
 
Pretest of the Scenarios and Items’ Development 
To ensure the validity and the reliability of the scenarios and the response strategy measures, 
we used a two-stage procedure. First, we discussed the scenarios and initial items with 
strategic alliance experts to ensure face validity. Second, we conducted two rounds of pre-
tests to evaluate the effectiveness of the manipulations and to refine the set of items to 
measure the seven response strategies. The first pre-test, with 87 students, resulted in some 
modifications to the scenario script due to increase the magnitude of the manipulation and to 
avoid some confounding effects. Several items were also either modified or dropped because 
of problems of reliability of discriminant validity and a few new ones were developed. The 
second pre-test, with 107 students, only led to minor modifications in the script and in the 
wording of a few items. This procedure resulted in the scenarios presented in the Appendix 
and in a total of 35 items to measure the seven response strategies (5 items for each strategy). 
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Data Collection 
The data for the study were collected among Dutch MBA students in their final year in 
business administration. During class hours, they were asked to participate in an experiment 
and only students with a positive reaction were provided with a one-page questionnaire. They 
were asked to read the instructions and scenario carefully and respond to the questions. The 
final sample consisted of 124 students, with an average age of 24.5 years and 68.1% were 
male and 31.9% female. 
 
Manipulation Checks 
The manipulation check items were subjected to a four-factor multiple analysis of variance 
(MANOVA). Subjects in the low economic performance condition reported lower satisfaction 
with the benefits derived from the alliance than did those in the high economic performance 
condition ( x  = 3.34 and 5.15, respectively; F1, 119 = 48.73, p-value < .001). Low relationship 
quality participants reported lower satisfaction with the working relationship than did their 
high relationship quality counterparts ( x  = 3.09 and 5.38, respectively; F1, 119 = 87.58, p-value 
< .001). Participants in the small investments condition reported that there would be easier to 
terminate the alliance without suffering substantial loss than did those in the large investments 
condition ( x  = 2.31 and 4.24, respectively; F1, 119 = 62.46, p-value < .001). And participants 
in the few alternatives condition reported having fewer partners available in order to achieve 
their objectives than did their plentiful alternatives counterparts ( x  = 3.39 and 5.72, 
respectively; F1, 119 = 82.61, p-value < .001). We further examined interaction terms to assess 
the stability of our manipulations. No sizable interaction effects were observed: the next 
largest F value was 9.09, which is small in comparison to those listed above. 
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RESULTS 
Reliability and Validity of the Seven Response Strategies 
To ensure unidimensionality, we submitted the items measuring each of the response strategy 
to factor analysis. This resulted in the dropping of several items loading on a second factor or 
with small loadings. Reliability coefficients were then calculated for the remaining items 
measuring the seven response strategies. Table 1 presents Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for 
each strategy on the diagonal of the correlation matrix. All the coefficients are satisfactory. 
The coefficients for aggressive voice, considerate voice, and neglect are however slightly 
lower than desired, which could be due to the fact that these strategies are more 
heterogeneous than the others due to a higher level of complexity (Rusbult et al., 1988). 
 
In addition, we assessed the discriminant validity by examining if the correlation between one 
scale and another is not as high as each scale’s Cronbach’s alpha coefficient (Gaski & Nevin, 
1985). We acknowledge that this is a much weaker form of discrimination than the 
conventional comparison of between-construct and within-construct-alternate measure 
correlations in MTMM format (Gaski, 1986). However, this procedure is adequate to test the 
discriminant validity of the seven response strategies which are conceptually related to each 
other in a circular system, and therefore may have some level of domain overlap. 
Furthermore, this procedure is consonant with the essential discriminant validity requirement 
that a measure should not correlate to highly with measures which it is supposed to differ. The 
results of Table 1 show that for the seven response strategies, the alpha coefficients are 
systematically higher than the correlation between the response strategies. Overall, the 
psychometric properties (i.e., convergent validity, reliability, and discriminant validity) of the 
response strategies provide support for hypothesis one. The seven response strategies are 
conceptually different and empirical distinct.  
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The Circular Structure of the Response Strategies 
In line with previous research (Farrell, 1983; Rusbult & Zembrodt, 1983), the response 
strategy data were analyzed on the basis of the correlation matrix derived from the likelihood 
rating of the response strategy items using a nonmetric multidimensional scaling (MDS) 
technique. MDS is a data reduction method similar to factor analysis, which is common for 
the structural analysis of similarity data (Davison, 1983; Schiffman, Reynolds, & Young, 
1981), which helps to visualize the data structure. Because, MDS is an exploratory method, an 
overall assessment of the fit between theory and empirical data can be achieved using a 
“configurational verification” approach (Gurtman, 1994; Schwartz, 1992). 
 
Hypothesis 2, which stated that the seven response strategies should be organized in a circular 
system, was tested by examining whether the points in a two-dimensional space could be 
partitioned into distinct regions that reflect the seven response strategies and whether the 
regions obtained form the suggested circular structure (Grunert & Juhl, 1995; Schwartz, 
1992). Two goodness-of-fit measures, stress, a measure of “badness of fit” which represents 
the difficulty of arraying responses in a configuration of a specified dimensionality (Kruskal, 
1964) and the total variance accounted for (squared multiple correlation or RSQ) (Borg & 
Lingoes, 1987), where used to assess the solution. For the two-dimensional solution 
postulated, stress is .127 and RSQ is .919, which are acceptable (Kruskal & Wish, 1978). 
Figure 1 shows the results of the two-dimensional MDS solution representing the seven 
response strategies. The results strongly support Hypotheses 1 and 2. Each response strategy 
forms a separate domain with only one item (Exit 1), which is slightly misplaced (Hypothesis 
1). Furthermore, the seven response strategies are placed along the circular structure in the 
expected order (Hypothesis 2). At the same time, the distinction between active, passive, 
constructive, and destructive strategies is supported.  
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The Impact of the Exchange Variables on Response Strategies 
The logic of the organization of the response strategy structure implies that the predicted 
association between response strategies and any outside variable (antecedent or consequence) 
can be represented graphically with a sinusoid (Gurtman, 1992; Gurtman et al., 1998; 
Schwartz, 1992). To draw such a curve, response strategies should be arrayed on the axis 
according to their order around the circular response structure. The strength of association 
with the outside variable is then plotted on the vertical axis. 
 
As a preliminary test of the impact of the antecedent variables on the likelihood of a response 
strategy, we first computed response strategy indices by averaging their item scores and then 
used correlation coefficient as measures of association between response strategies and 
economic satisfaction, relational quality, investments, alternatives. Figure 2 presents the 
sinusoid curves reflecting the patterns of association between the response strategies and the 
four exchange variables.  
 
To formally test the hypotheses regarding the influences on response strategies, a multiple 
analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) was conducted in which the dependent variables were 
the average scores for each of the seven response strategies, the independent variables were 
dummy variables from the scenario manipulations for economic and social satisfaction, 
transaction-specific investments, and alternatives, and gender and age (birth year) were 
incorporated in the model as the covariates. Interaction effects between the independent 
variables were also tested, and then removed due to non-significance. 
 
The MANCOVA results showed a significant Wilks’ lambda effect for the four dependent 
variables: financial performance (λ = .869, F = 2.398, p<.05), relational performance (λ 
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=.865, F = 2.480, p<.05), investments (λ = .875, F = 2.268, p<.05), and alternatives (λ =.683, 
F = 7.350, p<.001). None of the covariates were significant (see Table 2). 
 
Economic Satisfaction 
Managers who are satisfied with the financial performance of the alliance were hypothesized 
be the most likely to engage in patience and the least likely to engage in opportunism than 
managers which are dissatisfied with the economic performance of the alliance (Hypothesis 
3). The differences between low and high financial performance were significant for 
opportunism (F = 6.112, p < .01) and patience (F = 6.450, p < .01). The differences for the 
other response strategies are not significant. The results of post-hoc one-way ANOVAs 
presented in Table 2 support the hypothesis for opportunism and patience. Opportunism, an 
active-destructive strategy, is more likely to be used by managers who are dissatisfied with 
the financial performance of the alliance and patience, a passive-constructive strategy, is more 
likely to be used by managers who are satisfy with the financial performance of the alliance.  
 
Social Satisfaction 
Managers who are satisfied with the relational quality of the alliance were hypothesized to be 
the most likely to engage in creative and considerate voices and the least likely to engage in 
exit and opportunism than managers which are dissatisfied with the relational quality of the 
alliance (Hypothesis 4). The differences between low and high relational quality were 
significant for exit (F = 9.283, p < .01) and opportunism (F = 4.013, p < .05), but not for 
creative or considerate voice. The differences are also not significant for the other response 
strategies.  
The results of post-hoc one-way ANOVAs support the hypothesis for exit and opportunism. 
Exit and opportunism, two active-destructive strategies, are more likely to be used by 
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managers who are dissatisfied the relational performance of the alliance. The fact that the 
effects are not significant for considerate and creative voices shows that the effect of 
relational quality is asymmetric, when there is a problem within an alliance, a bad relationship 
quality is likely to lead to a destructive behavior. On the other hand, in a problematic alliance, 
good relationship quality is not enough to ensure a constructive behavior, other factors, such 




Managers who have not made substantial alliance-specific investments were hypothesized to 
be the most likely to engage in exit and neglect and the least likely to engage in considerate 
and creative voices than managers who have made substantial alliance-specific investments 
(Hypothesis 5). The differences between small and large investments were significant for 
neglect (F = 4.421, p < .01) and exit (F = 8.093, p < .01), but not for considerate or creative 
voices. Furthermore the difference was also significant for aggressive voice (F = 3.915, p < 
.05), which was not hypothesized. The results of post-hoc one-way ANOVAs support the 
hypothesis for neglect and exit. Neglect, a passive-destructive strategy, and exit, a active-
destructive strategy, are more likely to be used by managers who did not make significant 
transaction-specific investments and less likely to be used by managers who made significant 
transaction-specific investments. Aggressive voice is also more likely to be used by managers 
who did not make significant transaction-specific investments. In the case of a problematic 
alliance, managers who did not make significant transaction-specific investments are not 
afraid to be aggressive because they do not have much to loose if the relationship ends. 
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Alternatives 
Managers who have alternative partners available were hypothesized to be the most likely to 
engage in exit and opportunism and the least likely to engage in creative and considerate 
voices and patience than managers who do not have alternative partners available (Hypothesis 
6). The differences between alternative availability and non-availability were significant for 
exit (F = 2.399, p < .01), considerate voice (F = 5.819, p < .001), and patience (F = 1.977, p < 
.001). The relationship between alternatives ad creative voice was weaker, although 
statistically significant at the .10-level. Hypothesis 6 was supported by the results of post-hoc 
one-way ANOVAs as the likelihood of exit decreased and the likelihood of considerate voice 
and patience increased when mangers have alternatives available. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Empirical findings support the hypotheses to a large extent. The response strategies are 
conceptually different, empirically distinct, and can be represented as a circular system: exit, 
opportunism, aggressive voice, creative voice, considerate voice, patience, and neglect. 
Findings also reveal that the four exchange variables, economic and social satisfaction, 
investments, and alternatives have different effects on the seven response strategies.  
 
Conceptualization and measurement of response strategies has been an obstacle to the 
development of a more extensive understanding of how alliance managers respond to 
dissatisfaction and what factors influence these responses. This study offers strong empirical 
support for the validity of a seven strategy circular structure. A circular structure offers a 
number of advantages over other ad-hoc typologies, because it distinguishes between active-
passive and constructive-destructive dissatisfaction responses and is based on the degree of 
similarity and conflict between the different strategies. 
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The empirical validation of a circular response strategy model as well as the development of 
reliable measures for the seven strategies could serve as a basis for integrating the results of 
research on alliance dynamics around an accepted classification of responses to alliance 
problems. 
 
Findings substantiate the predictive and explanatory power of the investment model of 
dissatisfaction responses and affirm the influence of exchange variables on response strategies 
in problematic strategic alliances. The strong and consistent effect of a comprehensive group 
of predictors on a validated response strategy typology is encouraging given the tendency of 
past research to select predictor variables unsystematically and to examine the effect of these 
variables on only a limited number of response strategies. The use of a conceptual framework 
to guide the selection of exchange variables and the testing of their effects of response 
strategies consolidates research findings from diverse literatures on relationship management 
and contribute to the systematic development of alliance management knowledge and theory. 
 
Studying the effects of managerially relevant exchange variables on response strategies 
suggests ways in which alliance managers can select response strategies in order to manage 
their partner own responses to maximize the potential for mutually beneficial long-term 
relationships. It is to be noted that economic satisfaction is not the sole driver of a partner 
firm’s behavior. Alliance managers may therefore seek to improve the alliance’s efficiency by 
managing its partner’s behavior through adaptations in relational quality, transaction-specific 
investments, or the perception of the non-availability of better alternatives. 
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CONCLUSION 
The results of this study should be interpreted cautiously for several reasons. First, although 
findings suggest that participants were knowledgeable about alliance management, data were 
collected in a laboratory setting and MBA students rather than alliance managers participated 
in the study. Debriefing after the experiment about the purpose of the study discounted the 
likelihood of hypothesis guessing by participants. Nevertheless, business students could be 
more sensitized to active responses than practicing alliance managers and more likely to 
respond to the unambiguous dissatisfaction problems represented in the study as rational and 
conscientious managers. Future research should seek to replicate our results with practicing 
alliance managers. 
 
Second, behavioral intentions rather than actual behaviors were measured. While intentions 
are not always flawless predictors of behavior, our approach was based on the desire to assess 
the intensity of the likelihood of response strategies, an objective achieved more readily by 
measuring behavioral intention than behaviors (e.g., ‘did exit’ or ‘did not exit’). Survey 
studies of alliance managers may be used in future research to investigate real behaviors. 
 
Third, response strategies were examined from a static perspective that considered the effect 
of exchange variables on the likelihood of a particular strategy following a single problematic 
experience. Although exchange variables demonstrably affected response strategies, the study 
did not investigate the evolution of dissatisfaction responses over time by examining whether 
and how constructive and passive responses, such as patience and considerate voice were 
influenced by recurring problems. Determining the manner in which the likelihood of 
choosing a particular response strategy evolve temporally over a series of problem is an 
important research priority. This calls for longitudinal designs. 
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From a managerial perspective, there is considerable value in identifying threshold points for 
exchange variables below which response strategies are not activated. If for example, alliance 
managers understood the sensitivity of response strategies to the magnitude of dissatisfying 
problems as opposed to exit barriers (transaction specific investments and availability of 
alternatives), alliance managers could make highly informed decisions about the relative 
effectiveness of committing scarce resources to improving the alliance financial performance 
or relational quality as opposed to increasing its partner’s switching costs. 
 
These limitations notwithstanding, the study makes a number of important contributions by 
providing a systematic model of response strategies and proposing a framework to assess the 
impact of exchange variables. Further research may seek to corroborate these findings with 
different research design and in different application contexts. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
                
1 Financial Performance n.a.  -n.a.a            
2 Relational Performance n.a.  -.097 -n.a.           
3 Investments n.a.  -.080 -.015  n.a          
4 Alternatives n.a.  -.030 -.233** v -.189* v -n.a.         
5 Exit propensity 2.96 1.37 -.059 -.338*** .125 -.506*** -.915        
6 Opportunism 3.45 1.14 -.176†  -.201* -.032 -.122 -.186* v -.708       
7 Aggressive Voice 4.70 .84 -.087 -.047 -.153 -.118 -.192* v -.359
 *** 
-.619      
8 Creative Voice 5.73 .70 -.052 -.115 -.100 -.179* v -.406*** -.184* v -.006 -.812     
9 Considerate Voice 5.55 .86 -.035 -.006 -.055 -.314*** -.370*** -.044 -.121 -.395*** -.615    
10 Patience 1.84 .68 -.222* -.047 -.156 -.284** v -.122 -.105 -.005 -.156† v -.104 -.705   
11 Neglect 1.97 .69 -.023 -.069 -.200* v -.061 -.188* v -.158† v -.011 -.353*** -.181* -.484*** -.613  
12 Birth year 1980.5 2.34 -.059 -.072 -.014 -.080 -.194* v -.040 -.143 -.191* v -.129 -.050 -.194*  -n.a. 
13 Gender n.a.  -.102 -.140 -.056 -.160† v -.029 -.237** 
v 
-.072 -.163† v -.001 -.012 -0.67 -.136 
n = 124, † = p < .10; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001 
aValues in italic on the diagonal are Cronbach’s alpha coefficients 
 





Table 2. MANCOVA Results 






Patience Neglect Wilks λ 
(F- value) 


























         





































































































































         
n=124 
a Values are the mean level of each response, each of which had a possible range from 1 to 7 
b The F value in the rows list the univariate effect of each dependent variable 
c The multivariate column list the multivariate effect of each independent variable on the seven response strategies 
d † p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
N.B. L= low / H = high / O = born before 1980,5 / Y = born after 1980,5 / M = male / F = female 
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Appendix: Scenario Design 
General Introduction 
Imagine that you are an alliance manager at a firm called BIOPHARM. As an alliance manager you are responsible for all of 
the strategic alliances BIOPHARM is engaged in. It is your job to assure that the performance of each alliance meets 
BIOPHARM’s expectations. You have the authority and power to make any necessary decisions concerning the future of 
these alliances. In BIOPHARM’s portfolio of alliances, one of the alliances is an alliance with STARTECH. This alliance 





During the past year, the benefits BIOPHARM derived through the 
STARTECH alliance met the firm’s expectations. The financial 
objectives BIOPHARM had set were fully attained. More 
specifically, the alliance generated more revenues for BIOPHARM 
than it had initially expected. 
During the past year BIOPHARM’s benefits from the STARTECH 
alliance did not meet the firm’s expectations. The financial 
objectives BIOPHARM had set were not fully attained. More 
specifically, the alliance generated fewer revenues for BIOPHARM 




Up until now, STARTECH has been very cooperative and flexible 
when making necessary adjustments to the alliance. For example, 
necessary renegotiations to change contractual clauses were usually 
settled quickly. Consequently, the working relationship with 
STARTECH went very smoothly as both partners trusted one 
another completely and BIOPHARM did not need to allocate 
additional resources to monitor the alliance.  
Up until now, STARTECH has not been very cooperative and 
flexible when making necessary adjustments to the alliance. For 
example, on one occasion it took extensive renegotiations to change 
some minor contractual clauses. Consequently, the working 
relationship with STARTECH became more troublesome since both 
partners started to distrust one another and BIOPHARM had to 
allocate additional resources to monitor the alliance.  
 
Transaction specific investments 
Positive Negative 
In the past, BIOPHARM made some minor reusable investments to 
make the alliance with STARTECH work. For example, 
BIOPHARM has invested into a database, which is useful with or 
without the STARTECH alliance. In addition, only few additional 
costs are to be expected if BIOPHARM should terminate the 
STARTECH alliance. For example, no penalty fee would have to be 
paid to STARTECH if BIOPHARM prematurely ends the alliance. 
 
In the past, BIOPHARM made substantial specialized investments 
that would be lost if the STARTECH alliance were to be terminated. 
For example, BIOPHARM has invested into a tailor-made database, 
which is only useful, if exploited together with STARTECH. In 
addition, substantial costs can be expected if BIOPHARM should 
end the STARTECH alliance. For example, a high penalty fee has to 
be paid to STARTECH if BIOPHARM prematurely ends the 
alliance. 
 
Alternatives availability  
Positive Negative 
At this moment, BIOPHARM has plentiful alternatives available. 
For example, launching a new product without STARTECH can be 
considered as a serious alternative. Moreover, developing new 
products without STARTECH’s help is possible with only a few 
additional investments. In addition, various other firms can be 
viewed as potential partners to replace STARTECH and these firms 
are interested in forming an alliance with BIOPHARM.  
At this moment, BIOPHARM has few serious alternatives available. 
For example, launching a new product without STARTECH is too 
risky. Moreover, developing new products without STARTECH’s 
help is too costly, as substantial investments would be required. In 
addition, only a few other firms can be viewed as potential partners 
to replace STARTECH. In addition, most of these firms are already 
engaged in other alliances with BIOPHARM’s competitors.  
 
Question 
Please indicate how you would most likely respond to the situation described above, by circling the number (1-7) that 
corresponds best with your opinion. Try to distinguish as much as possible between your responses by using all the numbers. 
Please, respond as quickly and carefully as possible. Your first impression is usually your most accurate impression. There is 
no right or wrong answer as we are only interested in your opinion. Please, indicate how you would respond to the situation 
described above.  
 
 
